Reciprocal rewards promote the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:2232836
DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2020.127108OpenAlexW3115127200MaRDI QIDQ2232836
Huayan Pei, Huanmin Wang, Guanghui Yan
Publication date: 13 October 2021
Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2020.127108
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