Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties
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Publication:2235261
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2021.08.024zbMath1471.91132OpenAlexW3201276765MaRDI QIDQ2235261
Adin Safokem, Issofa Moyouwou, Aurelien Y. Mekuko
Publication date: 21 October 2021
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2021.08.024
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
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