Optimal R\&D investment strategy of pollution abatement and incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information
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Publication:2236211
DOI10.1155/2021/1042791zbMath1486.91050OpenAlexW3204259943MaRDI QIDQ2236211
Publication date: 22 October 2021
Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/1042791
Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis) (60H10) Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Ecology (92D40)
Cites Work
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- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Environmental investment and policy with distortionary taxes, and endogenous growth
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
- A differential game of R\&D investment for pollution abatement in different market structures
- Exceptional Paper—Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules: A Survey
- Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents
- Utility Functions
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