The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions
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Publication:2236864
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.07.054OpenAlexW3111753534MaRDI QIDQ2236864
Publication date: 26 October 2021
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.07.054
Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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- College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis
- Complementarity and aggregate implications of assortative matching: A nonparametric analysis
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