Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102522zbMath1471.91035OpenAlexW3158833299MaRDI QIDQ2237886

Hiroki Nishimura

Publication date: 28 October 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102522

zbMATH Keywords

revealed preferenceindividual rationalitysubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• A backward induction experiment
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Learning from a Piece of Pie
• Revealed Preference Tests of the Cournot Model
• Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes

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