Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
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Publication:2238374
DOI10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126965zbMath1479.91040OpenAlexW3094491114MaRDI QIDQ2238374
Xiaojie Chen, Shengxian Wang, Linjie Liu
Publication date: 1 November 2021
Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126965
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