Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery
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Publication:2238694
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103520OpenAlexW3157550419MaRDI QIDQ2238694
Piotr Faliszewski, Krzysztof Sornat, Pasin Manurangsi
Publication date: 2 November 2021
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10562
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