The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
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Publication:2241241
DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03675-9zbMath1480.91019OpenAlexW3035317949MaRDI QIDQ2241241
Rajnish Kumar, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Sudipta Sarangi, Surajit Borkotokey
Publication date: 8 November 2021
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/files/211893102/ANOR_revised.pdf
Related Items (5)
The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure ⋮ On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
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