Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
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Publication:2241564
DOI10.1007/s10479-021-04157-2zbMath1475.91027OpenAlexW3166491178MaRDI QIDQ2241564
Publication date: 9 November 2021
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04157-2
Lyapunov stabilityreplicator dynamicsasymmetric evolutionary gamesgames with infinite strategy spacestrong immovable and immutable facesweak attracting
2-person games (91A05) Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34) Nonlinear differential equations in abstract spaces (34G20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Spaces of games (91A70)
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Cites Work
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