Vertical product differentiation, managerial delegation and social welfare in a vertically-related market
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Publication:2243525
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2021.06.001zbMath1475.91107OpenAlexW3176218060MaRDI QIDQ2243525
Leonard F. S. Wang, Xingtang Wang
Publication date: 11 November 2021
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.06.001
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
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- Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
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- Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry
- Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry revised
- COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&D AND COLLUSION
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