Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01276-wzbMath1475.91073OpenAlexW2963489739MaRDI QIDQ2244420

Walter Bossert, Kotaro Suzumura, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 12 November 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/1107.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerplurality votingCondorcet losersDaunou's voting rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited

Cites Work

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