A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2020.104057zbMath1475.91396OpenAlexW3114783904MaRDI QIDQ2246693

Graeme Guthrie

Publication date: 16 November 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104057

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutioncorporate governanceentrenchmentexecutive compensationownership-based incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (1)

Competition and equilibrium effort choice

Cites Work

• Optimal and strategic timing of mergers and acquisitions motivated by synergies and risk diversification
• Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset
• Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
• The Bargaining Problem
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*
• Takeover Timing, Implementation Uncertainty, and Embedded Divestment Options
• Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm

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