When are efficient conventions selected in networks?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2246706
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104074zbMath1475.91039OpenAlexW3122888494MaRDI QIDQ2246706
Federica Farolfi, Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Johannes Buckenmaier
Publication date: 16 November 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104074
2-person games (91A05) Games involving graphs (91A43) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)
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