Optimal contract design of supplier-led outsourcing based on Pontryagin maximum principle

DOI10.1007/s10957-013-0415-4zbMath1290.49041OpenAlexW2021570167MaRDI QIDQ2247907

Wansheng Tang, Lin Feng, Jianxiong Zhang

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-013-0415-4

zbMATH Keywords

Pontryagin's maximum principlesupply chainprincipal-agentoutsourcing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Optimality conditions for problems involving ordinary differential equations (49K15)

Cites Work

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• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Production outsourcing: A linear programming model for the Theory-Of-Constraints
• The role of coherent supply chain strategy and performance management in achieving competitive advantage: an international survey
• A static allocation model for the outsourcing of warranty repairs

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