How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0720-8zbMath1291.91067OpenAlexW1979841798WikidataQ57340971 ScholiaQ57340971MaRDI QIDQ2247941

Florenz Plassmann, T. Nicolaus Tideman

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0720-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

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• Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
• On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• From individual to collective ordering through multidimensional attribute space
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

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