Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
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Publication:2249580
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0793-8zbMath1302.90044OpenAlexW1965381738MaRDI QIDQ2249580
Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami
Publication date: 2 July 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp13-16.pdf
Related Items (14)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Egalitarianism in the queueing problem ⋮ A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ No-envy in the Queueing Problem with Multiple Identical Machines
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