Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2249743
DOI10.1007/s00453-013-9753-8zbMath1291.91037arXiv1202.2877OpenAlexW2569128852MaRDI QIDQ2249743
Evangelia Pyrga, Kurt Mehlhorn, Giorgos Christodoulou, George Christodoulou
Publication date: 3 July 2014
Published in: Algorithmica, Algorithms – ESA 2011 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.2877
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)
Related Items (9)
Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games ⋮ Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms ⋮ Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms ⋮ Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty ⋮ Designing Cost-Sharing Methods for Bayesian Games ⋮ Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games ⋮ Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Worst-case equilibria
- Coordination mechanisms
- Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
- Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- On the convergence of descent methods for monotone variational inequalities
- Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
- How much can taxes help selfish routing?
- A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
- Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
- Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Non-preemptive Coordination Mechanisms for Identical Machine Scheduling Games
- Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
- Scheduling Selfish Tasks: About the Performance of Truthful Algorithms
- Equilibria for Networks with Lower Semicontinuous Costs: With an Application to Congestion Pricing
- Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
This page was built for publication: Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms