Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
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Publication:2253531
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2012.10.026zbMath1292.91115OpenAlexW2137165559WikidataQ39623656 ScholiaQ39623656MaRDI QIDQ2253531
Andreas J. Novak, Dieter Grass, Andrea Seidl, Peter M. Kort, Richard F. Hartl, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gustav Feichtinger
Publication date: 27 July 2014
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.10.026
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90)
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Cites Work
- On the persistence of corruption
- The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
- When in a drug epidemic should the policy objective switch from use reduction to harm reduction?
- Complex societal problems in operational research
- Enforcement swamping: A positive-feedback mechanism in rates of illicit activity
- Optimal dynamic law enforcement
- Optimal Control of Nonlinear Processes
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