Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.001zbMath1314.91117arXiv1212.3741OpenAlexW2089883131MaRDI QIDQ2253834

Qiqi Yan, Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date: 13 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.3741

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designincentive compatibilityprior-freeenvy freedomMyerson

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

Cites Work

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• Competitive auctions
• Knapsack auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal competitive auctions
• An Inequality

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