From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
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Publication:2254039
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.006zbMath1309.91090OpenAlexW2234046493MaRDI QIDQ2254039
Publication date: 4 February 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.006
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
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