An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions

DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0151-0zbMath1329.91094OpenAlexW1965977934MaRDI QIDQ2254236

Katsuhiko Nishizaki

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0151-0

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesspure exchange economyfull implementability in truthful strategiesLeontief utility functionsecure implementability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• Secure implementation in production economies
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

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