Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2256717
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2014.11.002zbMath1320.91055OpenAlexW2065610364MaRDI QIDQ2256717
Gábor Erdélyi, Lena Schend, Jörg Rothe, Michael R. Fellows
Publication date: 20 February 2015
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2014.11.002
computational social choiceparameterized complexityBucklin votingfallback votingcontrol complexityelection systems
Related Items (18)
Isomorphic Distances Among Elections ⋮ The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters ⋮ Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs ⋮ The complexity of priced control in elections ⋮ Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups ⋮ The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case ⋮ Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Constraint-based electoral districting using a new compactness measure: an application to Portugal ⋮ The possible winner with uncertain weights problem ⋮ Compromising as an equal loss principle ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control ⋮ Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis ⋮ Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections ⋮ Backdoors to planning ⋮ Combinatorial voter control in elections
Cites Work
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- How hard is it to control an election?
- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
- Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
- Parametrized complexity theory.
- The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
- Multimode Control Attacks on Elections
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Fair Majority Voting (or How to Eliminate Gerrymandering)
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
- Control and Bribery in Voting
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
- A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- Algorithms and Computation
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
