Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers
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Publication:2256983
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0811-5zbMath1319.91079OpenAlexW2013435165MaRDI QIDQ2256983
Publication date: 23 February 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0811-5
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Related Items (2)
Endogenous heterogeneity in duopoly with deterministic one-way spillovers ⋮ Price competition or price leadership
Cites Work
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- Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
- A Theory of Firm Scope*
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
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