Survivor's dilemma: defend the group or flee?

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2011.08.003zbMath1307.91026OpenAlexW2073672612WikidataQ50611493 ScholiaQ50611493MaRDI QIDQ2261826

Zoltán Varga, József Garay

Publication date: 13 March 2015

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationgroup selectioncollective gamegame between relativeshostile game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Under multilevel selection: ``When shall you be neither spiteful nor envious? ⋮ Survivor's dilemma: the evolution of cooperation in volatile environments ⋮ Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user

Cites Work

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• Time-dependent animal conflicts. I: The symmetric case
• Cooperation in defence against a predator
• The effect of dispersal and neighbourhood in games of cooperation
• Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on the spatial continuous prisoner's dilemma
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Adaptive Dynamics Based on Ecological Stability

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