Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.007zbMath1200.91063OpenAlexW2159805194MaRDI QIDQ2268110

Yan Chen, Kan Takeuchi

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicscombinatorial auctionsiBEA auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (8)

Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ Scheduling with package auctions ⋮ A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods ⋮ Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study ⋮ On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions ⋮ Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study ⋮ Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction ⋮ Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
• Learning under limited information.
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

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