Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.09.007zbMath1203.91207OpenAlexW2048498254MaRDI QIDQ2268121

Sérgio O. Parreiras, Anna Rubinchik

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

contest as a game of incomplete informationmonotone equilibrium behavior in contest with observable effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (15)

Group size and group success in conflicts ⋮ Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps ⋮ Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers ⋮ Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs ⋮ Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results ⋮ Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux ⋮ A tug-of-war team contest ⋮ The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions ⋮ Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link ⋮ An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests ⋮ Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach

Cites Work

• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• All-Pay Contests
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large

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