Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.005zbMath1203.91105OpenAlexW2153979658WikidataQ56852502 ScholiaQ56852502MaRDI QIDQ2268125

Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov

Publication date: 10 March 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5494&context=sw_master

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsearch frictionsmatching and bargainingdiamond's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (11)

Foundation of competitive equilibrium with non-transferable utility ⋮ FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS ⋮ Information sharing through digitalisation in decentralised supply chains ⋮ Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate ⋮ A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model ⋮ Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines ⋮ The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms ⋮ The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency? ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium

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