Foundations for contest success functions
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Publication:2268135
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0425-xzbMath1186.91021OpenAlexW2033787882MaRDI QIDQ2268135
Matthias Dahm, Luis C. Corchon
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3543
Related Items (24)
Group contest success functions ⋮ Properties of contests: constructing contest success functions from best-responses ⋮ Success in contests ⋮ Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ A Colonel Blotto Gladiator Game ⋮ Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Assortative matching by lottery contests ⋮ Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models ⋮ Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Trade and expropriation ⋮ Legal environment and contractual choice ⋮ The market for protection and the origin of the state ⋮ Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit ⋮ Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants ⋮ Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium ⋮ Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests ⋮ Innovation contests with entry auction ⋮ Probabilistic procurement auctions ⋮ The theory of contests: a survey ⋮ Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation ⋮ Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction ⋮ Discrimination in contests: a survey ⋮ Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases ⋮ Conflict and competition over multi-issues
Cites Work
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- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
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- Contest success functions
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- An alternative solution to bargaining problems with claims
- Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
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