Power indices and minimal winning coalitions

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0387-3zbMath1201.91050arXiv0806.3906OpenAlexW2164318894MaRDI QIDQ2268380

Jessica Langner, Werner Kirsch

Publication date: 8 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0806.3906

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ A probabilistic synopsis of binary decision rules ⋮ Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games ⋮ Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions ⋮ Average weights and power in weighted voting games ⋮ An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players ⋮ Limit theorems for multi-group Curie-Weiss models via the method of moments ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

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• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
• Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Discrete structures 1. Combinatorics, graph theory, algebra

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