Jury theorems with multiple alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0389-1zbMath1204.91048OpenAlexW1979368449MaRDI QIDQ2268382

Patrick Hummel

Publication date: 8 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0389-1

zbMATH Keywords

group decisionunanimitymultiple alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10)

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Cites Work

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