Inefficiencies on linking decisions
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Publication:2268896
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0412-6zbMath1201.91035OpenAlexW2133775554MaRDI QIDQ2268896
Publication date: 15 March 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:75c37d06-5407-4377-a558-3cdbaba19295
Related Items (4)
Efficient compromising ⋮ A simple mechanism for resolving conflict ⋮ Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
Cites Work
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- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Robust Mechanism Design
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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