Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations

DOI10.1134/S0005117910010091zbMath1186.93004OpenAlexW2048843901MaRDI QIDQ2269381

A. N. Subochev

Publication date: 16 March 2010

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117910010091

zbMATH Keywords

collective preference systemminimal dominating, uncovered, and minimal weakly stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decentralized systems (93A14) Applications of graph theory to circuits and networks (94C15)

Related Items (1)

Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule

Cites Work

• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Unnamed Item

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