The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
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Publication:2271097
DOI10.1007/s10683-008-9206-4zbMath1175.91048OpenAlexW2105940947MaRDI QIDQ2271097
Margaret McConnell, Eileen Chou, Charles R. Plott, Rosemarie Nagel
Publication date: 6 August 2009
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79564/
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