Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.001zbMath1425.91088OpenAlexW2949603558WikidataQ127641425 ScholiaQ127641425MaRDI QIDQ2273933

Martin Dufwenberg, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Alec Smith

Publication date: 19 September 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

frustrationpsychological gamesblamethreatsangerbelief-dependent preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (12)

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information ⋮ Frustration and anger in the ultimatum game: an experiment ⋮ On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust ⋮ Care and anger motives in social dilemmas ⋮ Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority ⋮ Cooperation between emotional players ⋮ Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: an experiment ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees ⋮ The broken chain: evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: an experimental approach
• Dynamic psychological games
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• The chain store paradox
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Frustration and anger in the ultimatum game: an experiment
• On blame and reciprocity: theory and experiments
• Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter
• A theory of reciprocity
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
• Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games.

This page was built for publication: Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games