Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.006zbMath1425.91065OpenAlexW2924012729WikidataQ127494789 ScholiaQ127494789MaRDI QIDQ2273949

Shota Ichihashi

Publication date: 19 September 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/swp2019-10.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosureBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Information design through scarcity and social learning

Cites Work

• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Experimental design to persuade
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments