Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.001zbMath1425.91097OpenAlexW2769478015WikidataQ127404997 ScholiaQ127404997MaRDI QIDQ2273966

Jiwei Zheng, Stefania Sitzia

Publication date: 19 September 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

groupscoordinationcognitionpayoff-irrelevant cues

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Uses Software

• hroot

Cites Work

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