Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.03.031zbMath1218.91113OpenAlexW2024606470MaRDI QIDQ2275657

Daniel John Zizzo, Nick Prokhovnik, Gordon Douglas Menzies, Timo Henckel

Publication date: 9 August 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.031

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitytime inconsistencyreputationinferential expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Related Items (1)

Conflicting evidence and decisions by agency professionals: an experimental test in the context of Merger regulation

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

This page was built for publication: Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations