Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation

DOI10.1007/BF02204849zbMath0723.90005MaRDI QIDQ2276853

Dominique Lepelley, Sven Berg

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet paradoxplurality rulestrategic votingstrategic manipulationexistence of cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

On probability models in voting theory

Cites Work

• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes

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