Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
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Publication:2278911
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.007zbMath1429.91017OpenAlexW2971628209WikidataQ127308448 ScholiaQ127308448MaRDI QIDQ2278911
Tarun Sabarwal, Eric J. Hoffmann
Publication date: 12 December 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www2.ku.edu/~kuwpaper/2019Papers/201908.pdf
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Cites Work
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