The swing voter's curse in social networks
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Publication:2278922
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.08.009zbMath1429.91255OpenAlexW2591477499WikidataQ127310610 ScholiaQ127310610MaRDI QIDQ2278922
Lydia Mechtenberg, Berno Buechel
Publication date: 12 December 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/253218/files/NDL2017-005.pdf
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Related Items (3)
Voting with public information ⋮ A general model of binary opinions updating ⋮ The swing voter's curse in social networks
Uses Software
Cites Work
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