Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.001zbMath1429.91021OpenAlexW2974751728WikidataQ127231387 ScholiaQ127231387MaRDI QIDQ2278929

Chun-Lei Yang, Binglin Gong

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationindirect reciprocityimage scorestandinghigher-order informationjudgingprisoners' dilemma experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Social norms and random matching games
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Expected utility theory and prospect theory: One wedding and a decent funeral
• The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

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