Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.011zbMath1429.91341OpenAlexW2978132337WikidataQ127188976 ScholiaQ127188976MaRDI QIDQ2278937

Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao, Zhengqing Gui

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://core.ac.uk/reader/6330618

zbMATH Keywords

limited liabilityincentive-compatibilityfinancial contractingcostly liquidationindivisible collateral

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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