Corrigendum to ``Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.01.006zbMath1429.91153OpenAlexW1964752686MaRDI QIDQ2278941

Eve Ramaekers, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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