Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.003zbMath1429.91167arXiv1507.02615OpenAlexW2888870252WikidataQ129333180 ScholiaQ129333180MaRDI QIDQ2278943

Rad Niazadeh, Yang Yuan, Saeed Alaei, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02615

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauction theoryanonymous pricingoptimal auctionsecond price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (12)

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ Optimal revenue guarantees for pricing in large markets ⋮ Optimal pricing for MHR distributions ⋮ Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs ⋮ Prophet secretary through blind strategies ⋮ From pricing to prophets, and back! ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing ⋮ On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions ⋮ Pricing Social Goods

Cites Work

• Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
• Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing
• Unnamed Item

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