On the hardness of designing public signals
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Publication:2278949
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.001zbMath1429.91068OpenAlexW2886157879MaRDI QIDQ2278949
Publication date: 12 December 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.001
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Games involving graphs (91A43) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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