Information security decisions for two firms in a market with different types of customers

DOI10.1007/s10878-019-00446-6OpenAlexW2970934833MaRDI QIDQ2279760

Jun Pei, Xiaofei Qian, Panos M. Pardalos, Xin-Bao Liu, Mi Zhou

Publication date: 13 December 2019

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-019-00446-6

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumoptimal solutiongame modelcoordination contractinformation security decisionloyal customerswitcher

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

A game of information security investment considering security insurance and complementary information assets

Cites Work

• Information security investment for competitive firms with hacker behavior and security requirements
• Security investment and information sharing in the market of complementary firms: impact of complementarity degree and industry size
• A differential game approach to information security investment under hackers' knowledge dissemination

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