Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté

DOI10.1007/s00182-019-00670-8zbMath1430.91024OpenAlexW2923062218MaRDI QIDQ2280050

Aviad Heifetz

Publication date: 17 December 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00670-8

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityk-level reasoningrobust multiplicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
• Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
• Set Theory
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements

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