The modal logic of Bayesian belief revision

DOI10.1007/s10992-018-9495-9zbMath1457.03039OpenAlexW2769661317MaRDI QIDQ2281313

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 19 December 2019

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9495-9

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicBayesian inferenceBayes learningMedvedev framesBayes logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (3)

STANDARD BAYES LOGIC IS NOT FINITELY AXIOMATIZABLE ⋮ Having a look at the Bayes blind spot ⋮ Bayesian belief revision based on Agent's criteria

Cites Work

• Probabilistic logic
• On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization
• Modal counterparts of Medvedev logic of finite problems are not finitely axiomatizable
• In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
• Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Knowledge Puzzles
• Dynamic logic for belief revision
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• GENERAL PROPERTIES OF BAYESIAN LEARNING AS STATISTICAL INFERENCE DETERMINED BY CONDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS
• STANDARD BAYES LOGIC IS NOT FINITELY AXIOMATIZABLE
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