Exchange-stability in roommate problems

DOI10.1007/S10058-018-0217-0zbMath1429.91229OpenAlexW3125310035MaRDI QIDQ2281440

Azar Abizada

Publication date: 19 December 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0217-0

zbMATH Keywords

roommate problemexchange-stabilityiteratively mutually best

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

On (coalitional) exchange-stable matching ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange

Cites Work

• When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• The roommates problem revisited
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• The exchange-stable marriage problem
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On the complexity of exchange-stable roommates

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