The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited

DOI10.1007/s10058-019-00221-3zbMath1429.91155OpenAlexW2183149382MaRDI QIDQ2281446

Toyotaka Sakai, Noriaki Okamoto

Publication date: 19 December 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00221-3

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceBorda rulescoring ruleCondorcet criterionpairwise-majority-loser

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• The Borda dictionary
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Condorcet’s Paradox